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Insecure Communities: Examining Local
Government Participation in US Immigration and
Customs Enforcement’s “Secure Communities”
Program
Rachel R. Ray
In the last several years, suffering global economies, war, ethnic and
racial tensions, natural disasters, and other exigencies have led to a steady
stream of immigrants to the United States. They seek jobs, refuge, asylum,
and better opportunities. In fiscal year 2010, the United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) removed a record-setting 392,000
undocumented immigrants, half of which were convicted criminals.1 Yet a
careful look behind this impressive number would undoubtedly reveal
families torn apart by the removal of undocumented spouses, parents,
siblings, and children convicted only of nonviolent crimes, traffic
violations, or other minor infractions.2 ICE’s own data shows that 79



J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law, rrray@ucdavis.edu. This piece is
dedicated to beloved Professor Keith Aoki, without whom I would never have written
this article. May his legacy continue in those whom he inspired to go beyond their selfimposed limits. Many thanks to Dean Kevin Johnson, Professor Bill Ong Hing, Professor
Lisa Pruitt, Errol Dauis, Julien Capers, William McKenna, and Lov Goel for their
invaluable guidance.
1
Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces RecordBreaking Immigration Enforcement Statistics Achieved under the Obama Administration
(Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1286389936778.shtm.
2
See,
e.g.,
NDLON,
Petition
to
Secretary
Napolitano,
http://action.altoarizona.com/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=4383 (last visited Nov.
18, 2010) (describing a petition sponsored by multiple community organizations
opposing S-Comm) (“[recent statistics touted by DHS confirm that a historic record
number of families have been torn apart under the Obama Administration’s management
of DHS.”). ICE has also mistakenly attempted to deport citizens. See, e.g., Lornet
Turnbull, Citizen Wrongly Held as Illegal Immigrant Gets $400,000, SEATTLE TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2011),
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percent of people deported through its “Secure Communities” (S-Comm)
program are noncriminals or were detained for lower-level offenses, such as
traffic violations.3 S-Comm is just one of many initiatives designed to
identify and deport undocumented people, specifically those convicted of
crimes. Try as it might, the US government has not yet found a successful
way to deter illegal immigration, nor has it developed satisfactory
immigration reform.
This article considers ICE’s S-Comm program, options for local law
enforcement agencies and local governments to resist complying with it,
and ways to implement the program less stringently in cases involving
noncriminal, undocumented immigrants. Further, this article explores the
potential and actual problems that arise with S-Comm, as well as the legal
framework for local enforcement of federal immigration laws. Next, this
article includes specific examples of immigration enforcement and
noncompliance in several counties in California, including Los Angeles,
Santa Clara, and San Francisco. Finally, this article suggests improvements
that the federal government should make to S-Comm to ensure that the
program is just and constitutional. S-Comm has been flawed since its
inception, and it must be changed.

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014325563_detained25m.html.
3
See ACLU Statement on Secure Communities, AM. C.L. UNION (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-statement-secure-communities
(describing
the dangers associated with S-Comm) (“Because it targets people at the time of arrest, SComm captures people who will never be charged with a state crime—including crime
victims, witnesses, and individuals subjected to unconstitutional arrests.”) [hereinafter
ACLU Statement].
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, immigration enforcement in the United States has primarily
been the task of the federal government. Criminal law enforcement, on the
other hand, has been state governments’ responsibility.4 Immigration and
criminal law were intended to remain distinct areas of enforcement. Though
this division of enforcement remained intact for many years, it is changing
in part because grounds for deportation or inadmissibility as an immigrant
arise from violations of criminal laws.5 Since the mid-1990s, state and local
governments have become much more engaged in immigration
enforcement. State and local law enforcement cooperation with immigration
authorities, 287(g) agreements,6 and legislation such as Arizona Senate Bill
1070 (SB 1070)7 break down the traditional division between immigration
enforcement and criminal law enforcement.8 The US Immigration and
Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) “Secure Communities” program (S-Comm)
is part of the breakdown of this division of enforcement.
This article examines S-Comm and its effects on local law enforcement
agencies (LLEAs), local governments, and immigrant communities, and
calls for changes to the program that should be made if it is to be

4

For more information about the intersection between criminal and immigration law,
see Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 379 (2006) (discussing the roots of and motivation behind the
merger of the two fields of law); see also Jennifer M. Chacon, Managing Migration
Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (Dec. 2009) (describing the trend of
criminal prosecutions of migration-related offenses and the decreasing protections related
to such prosecutions).
5
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2010).
6
Congress passed Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §
1357(g)) in 1995, enabling state and local law enforcement agencies to enter into
agreements with the federal government so that they may enforce immigration laws. See
infra p. 364.
7
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (as modified by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)) (“SB 1070”); A.R.S. § 11-1051(B).
8
See supra note 4; infra Part IV.

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: VOICES FOR CHANGE

Insecure Communities

implemented nationwide. Part II describes the steps involved in the SComm information-sharing process. Part III discusses S-Comm’s potential
and actual effects on public safety, family unity, and civil rights. Part IV
examines the question of whether S-Comm exceeds the federal
government’s powers. Part V looks at “sanctuary cities” and other methods
of resistance to S-Comm. This article concludes with suggestions for
effectively reforming S-Comm by giving examples of the implementation
of these reforms with the intention of remedying the detrimental impact of
the program on immigrants and their communities. The federal government
should allow local governments to opt out of S-Comm, and the government
agencies responsible for the program and its oversight must ensure that
federal, state, and local government employees implement recently
proposed changes to the program.

II. THE SECURE COMMUNITIES INFORMATION-SHARING PROCESS
ICE introduced S-Comm9 in March 2008, referring to it as a
“comprehensive strategy to improve and modernize the identification and
removal of criminal aliens from the United States.”10 Since its activation in
October 2008, S-Comm has helped ICE identify and deport more than

9

I refer to “Secure Communities” as S-Comm throughout this article because I believe
its actual effect on communities is to make them less “secure” by chilling crime reporting
and negatively impacting domestic violence victims. See, e.g., Marie C. Baca,
Immigration Initiative May Put Domestic Violence Victims at Risk, CALIFORNIA WATCH
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/immigration-initiative-may-putdomestic-violence-victims-risk-8993; Renee Feltz & Stokely Baksh, Immigration
Crackdown Creates Insecure Communities, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/security/video-immigration-crackdown-createsinsecure-communities/2964/.
10
Press Release, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf., Desoto County to Benefit from ICE
Strategy to Enhance the Identification, Removal of Criminal Aliens Uses Biometrics to
Prioritize Immigration Enforcement Actions Against Convicted Criminal Aliens (Oct. 1,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1010/101001desoto.htm.
[hereinafter Desoto County News Release].
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86,616 undocumented immigrants convicted of crimes.11 This number
includes more than 12,200 “criminal aliens” convicted of serious crimes and
over 29,500 “criminal aliens”12 convicted of less serious crimes.13
According to ICE, “criminal aliens” are undocumented immigrants
convicted of a crime.14 Undocumented immigrants who are charged with
crimes, but not yet convicted, are not considered to be “criminal aliens.”15
ICE classifies undocumented immigrants convicted of a criminal offense
into three categories. Level 1 crimes present the greatest threat and include
murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, major drug offenses, and national
security crimes.16 Level 2 crimes present the second greatest threat and
include minor property and drug offenses, such as larceny, fraud, burglary,
and money laundering. Level 3 crimes include all “other offenses.”17 Level
2 and 3 crimes “account for the majority of crimes committed by aliens.”18
Though ICE hopes to implement S-Comm nationwide by 2013, the
agency is focusing first on “criminal aliens in locations where analysis
determines they are most likely to reside.”19 As of June 30, 2011, S-Comm

11

U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS (Jun. 30,
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf
[hereinafter NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS].
12
“Criminal aliens” is the term ICE uses to describe undocumented immigrants convicted
of crimes. I use this ICE term strictly as a term of art.
13
Desoto County News Release, supra note 10.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.& CUSTOMS ENF. & [STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU]
TEMPLATE,
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf
[hereinafter ICE-SIB AGREEMENT].
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Secure Communities Deployment, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF.,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/deployment/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010), text
available at D.A. King, Coming Soon to Many Georgia Communities; DHS/ICE Secure
Communities Program, DUSTIN INMAN SOC’Y BLOG (Jan. 18, 2010, 2:39 PM),

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: VOICES FOR CHANGE

Insecure Communities

was in place in 1,508 of 3,181 jurisdictions in forty-four states and
territories.20 For example, only 1 percent of jurisdictions in Kentucky, 4
percent of jurisdictions in both Pennsylvania and Wyoming, and 5 percent
of jurisdictions in Montana had been activated as of June 30, 2011.21 No
jurisdictions in Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, District of Columbia, or Vermont had been activated as of
that same date. By contrast, 100 percent of jurisdictions in Arizona,
California, Delaware, Florida, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin had been activated as
of June 30, 2011.22
S-Comm was intended to increase public safety by prioritizing the
identification and removal of undocumented immigrants with criminal
convictions. S-Comm seeks to achieve this goal by enlisting LLEAs to
submit arrestees’ fingerprints to the State Identification Bureau (SIB) at the
time of each booking.23 ICE requests that LLEAs submit fingerprints
electronically to the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS) as soon as possible during the booking process.24

http://thedustininmansociety.org/blog/?p=2910. Some of the problems that arose since
DHS enacted S-Comm may be a consequence of its initial piecemeal implementation of
the program. Had ICE rolled out the program nationally at one time, perhaps the highly
problematic inconsistencies that counties are grappling with today could have been
avoided.
20
NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 11.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES
§
2.1
at
3
(Sep.
3,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf
[hereinafter SOP].
24
Id. § 3.1.1, at 7. IAFIS, the “largest biometric database in the world,” is a national
system available twenty-four hours a day to help solve and prevent crime through
fingerprint searches, criminal history, alias, and image databases, and electronic exchange
of fingerprints. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF
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The SIB then transmits the fingerprints electronically to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services
Division (CJIS).25 State participants in the National Fingerprint File
Program send fingerprints to CJIS at the time of the individual’s initial
arrest.26 CJIS’s receipt of the ten fingerprints initiates both IAFIS and
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (USVISIT) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) searches.27 If
an IDENT search matches a fingerprint, CJIS automatically sends an
Immigration Alien Query to the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center
(LESC) in order to verify the individual’s criminal history and immigration
status.28 LESC then creates and sends an Immigration Alien Response
(IAR) to CJIS and the local ICE Detention and Removal Operations Office
(DRO) within four hours of fingerprint submission to IAFIS and IDENT.29
This entire process takes place before charges have been filed against the
immigrant.
After receiving the IAR from the LESC, ICE determines whether to issue
a detainer. ICE will file an immigration detainer if the noncitizen in
question is charged with a Level 1 offense or if he or she has a Level 1
conviction that could result in removal. ICE files these detainers with the
LLEA with custody of the individual at the time of booking.30 Although
ICE claims that S-Comm “prioritizes enforcement action toward the
greatest threats to public safety” through the removal of “criminal aliens”
convicted of crimes such as homicide, kidnapping, rape, and threatening

INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last
visited Nov. 19, 2010).
25
SOP, supra note 23, § 2.1, at 3.
26
Id.
27
Id. § 2.1.1, at 4.
28
Id.
29
Id. § 3.1.6, at 7.
30
Id. § 2.1.5, at 5.
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national security (Level 1 offenders), the program permits ICE discretion
regarding processing of Level 2 and 3 offenders.31
Under S-Comm, only ICE determines the individual’s “alienage” and
removability after a detainer is issued. ICE makes that determination based
on an interview it conducts in person or via telephone or video
teleconference;32 however, an ICE field office will issue detainers, as
deemed “appropriate,” with the LLEA.33 If an LLEA releases an
undocumented immigrant before ICE issues a detainer, ICE may request
information about the individual’s location and identification from the
LLEA.34 Pursuant to the immigration detainer, ICE should assume custody
of the undocumented immigrant within forty-eight hours (not counting
Saturdays, Sundays, or federal holidays) of notification of an immigrant’s
release. After taking undocumented immigrants convicted of serious
criminal offenses into custody, ICE will take “immediate action” to remove
them.35
According to ICE, “[t]he biometric information sharing capability
[involved in S-Comm] takes place at a federal level and happens
automatically when a subject’s fingerprints are submitted upon booking.
This automatic process requires no change to law enforcement’s daily

31

Id. § 1.0, at 3.
Id. § 3.2.1., at 8.
33
Id. § 3.1.7, at 8.
34
Id. § 2.1.5, at 5.
35
Id. § 3.2.4, at 8. “Normally, ICE will not remove an alien until pending criminal
charges are adjudicated. If ICE wishes to remove an alien whose charges have not been
adjudicated, ICE will make all efforts to inform the local LEA, the prosecutor and the
court with jurisdiction over the criminal offense on the status of the subject’s removal
proceedings.” Id. § 3.2.5.
32
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operations.”36 Further, ICE’s former37 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/ICE and SIBs states:
This MOA does not affect a state’s existing relationship with the
FBI CJIS Division. Rather, the MOA builds on and enhances that
relationship. Neither the SIB nor any state or local LEA that is
subject to this MOA will be responsible for determining an
individual’s immigration status or whether a particular conviction
renders an individual removable pursuant to the INA.38
Despite the MOA and a recent directive issued by ICE Director John
Morton, ICE requests that LLEAs abide by conditions stated in the
immigration detainer.39 LLEAs must not detain an undocumented
immigrant for a period exceeding forty-eight hours. They must inform ICE
if the subject is transferred or released, file the detainer in the subject’s
record or file, allow ICE officers and agents access to detainees, assist ICE
in acquiring booking and/or detention information about detainees, comply
with CJIS and US-VISIT rules, and include S-Comm in community
policing and other outreach activities.40 In fact, in order to take part in SComm and provide DHS with fingerprint data, LLEAs must make changes
to their current technology or install new fingerprinting equipment.41

36

US IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF., BENEFITTING LAW ENFORCEMENT THROUGHOUT THE
UNITED
STATES
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/lea-benefits.pdf.
37

As of August 2011, ICE will terminate all existing S-Comm MOAs. See infra p. 372.

38

ICE-SIB AGREEMENT, supra note 15.
Letter from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf. (Aug. 5, 2011),
available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/27924754/Sec-Comm%20govlet%208-5-11.pdf.
40
Id.; SOP, supra note 23, § 2.2.1–8, at 6.
41
Kirk Semple, Confusion Over Program to Spot Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2010, at A26.
39
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III. A NATION OF “SECURE” COMMUNITIES: S-COMM’S EFFECTS
When S-Comm began in 2008, ICE implemented the program in just
fourteen LLEA jurisdictions. As of June 30, 2011, forty-seven percent of
jurisdictions had applied the program, and DHS is on track to expand the
program to all LLEAs across the country by 2013.42 Fiscal year (FY) 2010
statistics show a 70 percent increase in removal of “criminal aliens”
compared to FY 2008.43 In 2010, S-Comm’s implementation resulted in the
arrest of 21,000 Level 1 offenders and more than 59,000 “convicted
criminal aliens” total.44 However, ICE’s own data suggests that many
detainers issued through S-Comm were placed against noncriminal
individuals or those convicted of Level 2 or 3 crimes.45 This action is not
only in opposition to the program’s purpose, but it is also unfair.
S-Comm has been widely criticized across the country by politicians,
attorneys, law enforcement officials, and by advocates of immigrant rights,
human rights, and domestic violence victims.46 Some immigrant rights
advocates analogize S-Comm to a nationwide version of Arizona’s SB
1070;47 S-Comm puts benign offenders—for example, those who miss a

42

NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 11.
Id.
Secure Communities Deployment, supra note 19.
45
See US IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF., SECURE COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS
INTEROPERABILITY, MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH APRIL 30, 2011 (May 23, 2011),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interoperability_statsfy2011-feb28.pdf.
46
See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, PROJECT VOICE NEW ENGLAND, ET
AL., RESTORING COMMUNITY: A NATIONAL COMMUNITY ADVISORY REPORT ON ICE’S
FAILED “SECURE COMMUNITIES” PROGRAM (Aug. 2011), available at
http://altopolimigra.com/documents/FINAL-Shadow-Report-regular-print.pdf.
47
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin et al.,
Arizona Senate Bill 1070: A Preliminary Report on Legal Issues Raised by Arizona’s
New Statute Regulating Immigration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 35 (2010) (pinpointing
the central legal issues raised by Arizona S.B. 1070); see, e.g., Mary McThomas,
Federalism, States’ Rights and Immigration Policy (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n Working
Paper 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641907.
43
44
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stop sign—at risk for deportation. Additionally, it implicitly encourages
racial profiling while breaking down trust between immigrant communities
and LLEAs.
To determine if S-Comm in its current iteration carries out its stated goal,
it is necessary to examine the program’s implementation. In February 2010,
the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), the National Day Laborer
Organizing Network (NDLON), and the Benjamin Cardozo Immigration
Justice Clinic filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for ICE
documents concerning S-Comm.48 In April 2010, the three groups filed a
lawsuit in the Southern District of New York “due to the urgent public need
for the requested records.”49 ICE responded by releasing important records,
including cumulative data about S-Comm. Information released in response
to CCR, NDLON, and Cardozo’s FOIA request revealed that 79 percent of
those deported under S-Comm had no criminal record or had been arrested
or detained for low-level offenses.50 As of June 30, 2010, 32 percent of
individuals given over to ICE custody via S-Comm were noncriminals—up
from 22 percent in FY 200951—and 26 percent of S-Comm deportees also
had no criminal records.52 However, this number varied greatly by county
and by state. For example, 82 percent of individuals in Travis County,
Texas, and 54 percent of individuals deported through S-Comm in

48

Ctr. for Const. Rights et al., Briefing Guide to “Secure Communities”—ICE’s
Controversial Immigration Enforcement Program New Statistics and Information Reveal
Disturbing Trends and Leave Crucial Questions Unanswered (Aug. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw741/NDLON_FOIA_Briefing%20guide.final.pdf [hereinafter CCR Briefing Guide].
49
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) v. US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency (ICE), CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/securecommunities (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
50
CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48.
51
Id.
52
Id.
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Maricopa County, Arizona, had no criminal records.53 ICE’s own data
indicates that ICE and LLEAs are not implementing S-Comm uniformly,
nor as it was intended.
Detention and deportation of noncriminal, undocumented immigrants are
just two of the risks posed by S-Comm. On June 17, 2011, ICE attempted to
address concerns raised by immigrant and domestic violence victim
activists.54 ICE now encourages ICE officers, attorneys, and special agents
to exercise their prosecutorial discretion and refrain from asserting the “full
scope” of their authority to enforce immigration policy when appropriate.55
In particular, ICE encourages favorably exercising prosecutorial discretion
toward survivors of domestic violence or other serious crimes, as well as
witnesses and plaintiffs in litigation regarding violations of civil rights or
liberties.56 However, these changes to S-Comm’s implementation may
prove to be inadequate. According to Thomas A. Saenz, Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund president and general counsel, ICE’s
reforms “amount to little more than lipstick on a pig, except that this is a
snarling, vicious, and rabid pig that will continue to run rampant and inflict
serious damage on families and communities across the nation.”57 Further,

53

Id. Maricopa County’s high number may have been a result of the county’s sheriff,
who “is notorious for staging indiscriminate immigration raids.” Editorial, Immigration
Bait and Switch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A22.
54
See Memorandum Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses,
and Plaintiffs, from John Morton, Dir., US Immigr. & Customs Enf., to all Field Office
Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf
[hereinafter
Morton I]; see also Memorandum Regarding Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, John Morton, Dir., US IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF. (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [hereinafter Morton II].
55
See Morton II, supra note 54.
56
Id.
57
MALDEF Response to Secure Communities Program Changes, MALDEF,
http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/secure_communities_program_changes_response/.
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the reform is likely premature because it was announced before ICE and the
inspector general adequately reviewed the program. California
Assemblymember Tom Ammiano proposes that ICE should suspend SComm and wait for the inspector general report so that they may develop
better policies.58 Described below are a number of other concerns, as well as
comments on ICE’s efforts to address such concerns.
A. Reduction in the Reporting of Crimes
S-Comm is a “source of anxiety”59 for LLEAs, cities, and counties
wanting to maintain a clear distinction between federal immigration
enforcement and local law enforcement. Because S-Comm has only recently
been deployed on a large scale, it remains unclear what the impact on local
law enforcement practices will be. Negative impact in communities with
large immigrant populations is of particular concern.
If immigrant communities view local law enforcement officers as
enforcers of immigration law, LLEAs may lose the confidence of
immigrants.60 Law enforcement agencies rely on this confidence in order to
receive compliance with the law and during criminal proceedings.61
According to Charlie Beck, Los Angeles chief of police, “[S-Comm causes]
a divide where there’s a lack of trust, a lack of reporting, a lack of

58
Press Release, Tom Ammiano, Assemblymember, Cal. State Assembly, “Cosmetic
‘Reforms’ to S-Comm More Spin than Substance” (June 17, 2011), available at
http://asmdc.org/members/a13/news-room/press-releases/item/2935-cosmetic-reforms-tos-comm-more-spin-than-substance [hereinafter Cosmetic Reforms].
59
Semple, supra note 41, at A30. For an illustration of local law enforcement’s antiimmigration stance in the rural South, see Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in
the Rural South, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135, 159 (2009).
60
Interview with Kevin Johnson, Dean, UC Davis Sch. of Law, in Davis, CA (Oct. 13,
2010) [hereinafter Dean Johnson Interview].
61
Id.
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cooperation with police.”62 If LLEAs expand their duties to include
immigration matters, undocumented immigrants will likely feel
uncomfortable reporting crime, “thus encouraging criminals to further
victimize [immigrant] communities and spread into the community at
large.”63 Criminals may target undocumented immigrants if they know that
as victims, those immigrants and their communities are unlikely to
cooperate with police who are known to be involved in reporting
undocumented immigrants to immigration officials.64 Further, immigrant
communities are closely knit. Once information circulates that arrest, even
without conviction, can lead to deportation, there may be a rise in resistance
to or evasion of arrest and an imposition of “new layers of fear and
isolation” on immigrants.65 Unfortunately, ICE’s June 2011 changes do not
specifically address this concern, possibly because DHS and ICE take the
position that “it remains the responsibility of each jurisdiction to abide by
its constitutional obligation to avoid discriminatory policing.”66

62

Leslie Berenstein Rojas, LAPD Chief on Secure Communities: “It Tends to Cause a
Divide,” MULTI-AMERICAN (June 3, 2011), http://multiamerican.scpr.org/2011/06/lapdchief-on-secure-communities-it-tends-to-cause-a-divide/ (quoting an interview by Patt
Morrison with Charlie Beck, Chief, L.A. Police Dep’t, in Los Angeles, Cal. (June 2,
2011), available at http://www.scpr.org/programs/patt-morrison/2011/06/02/19343/askthe-chief-update-with-lapds-top-cop-charlie-be).
63
Gail Pendleton, Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws and its Effects on
Victims of Domestic Violence, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legal_archives/Archive_Local%20Enforceme
nt%20and%20Domestic%20Violence-1.doc.
64
Anne B. Chandler, Why is the Policeman Asking for My Visa? The Future of
Federalism and Immigration Enforcement, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 209, 233
(2008).
65
Id. See also Editorial, supra note 53.
66
Memorandum from Margo Schlanger, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. & Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., US Immigr. & Customs Enf., To all
ICE
and
CRCL
Personnel
(June
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/complaintprotocol.pdf.
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B. Explicit or Implicit Racism
According to ICE, S-Comm reduces ethnic and racial profiling.67
However, data obtained via the CCR/NDLON/Cardozo FOIA request
suggests that S-Comm actually contributes to and conceals racial
profiling.68 S-Comm enables willing state and local law enforcement
officials to stop and arrest individuals based upon their appearance. Those
suspected to be undocumented can be arrested and deported.69 Because SComm sends fingerprints to ICE at the booking stage, rather than at the
charging or conviction stage, ICE is notified almost instantaneously after a
law enforcement official arrests an undocumented immigrant. This facet of
the program may encourage LLEAs to arrest individuals they deem
“foreign-looking” in order to send their fingerprints to ICE.70 Aware of this
possibility, ICE uploaded a briefing to YouTube on June 20, 2011 that
includes a warning to LLEAs that decisions to arrest or book should not be

67

CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48.
CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48. See also Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling
in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v.
United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1076
(April 2010) (discussing the long-standing use of racial profiling by law enforcement and
two Supreme Court cases that, in effect, permit such profiling) (“Unfortunately, the
events of September 11, 2001, noticeably slowed the movement to end racial profiling.
To the contrary, the US government relied heavily on racial, national origin, and religious
profiles in the newly proclaimed ‘war on terror.’ The comeback of racial profiling and its
subsequent retrenchment reveals the difficulties of racial minorities relying on the
political process in pursuit of social justice and suggests the need for different minority
groups to work together politically in order to eliminate racial profiling.”).
69
CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48.
70
See, e.g., ACLU Statement, supra note 3; see also Bill Ong Hing, Understanding
SB1070 From the Lens of Institutionalized Racism and Civil Rights, RACE EQ. PROJECT
E-NEWSL. (Legal Servs. of N. Cal., Inc., Sacramento, Cal.), Sept. 30, 2010,
http://www.equity.lsnc.net/understanding-sb1070-from-the-lens-of-institutionalizedracism-and-civil-rights/; Jason G. Idilbi, Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law:
Should North Carolina Communities Implement 287(g) Authority?, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1710, 1725–28 (2008).
68
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based on perceptions of race, ethnicity, or ability to speak English.71 Any
decline in the amount of racial profiling related to S-Comm has not yet been
documented.
Though law enforcement officers’ motivations may not be entirely clear,
the following story illustrates the possibility that officers may stop
individuals based on appearance. Felipe, a twenty-nine-year-old Mexican
national who has lived in the United States since he was four years old, has
no ability to become a US citizen unless he marries a US citizen.72 One
afternoon in early 2010, two police officers pulled him over while he was
driving home from work in Santa Barbara, California. Felipe was not
speeding. When he asked the officers why he had been stopped, they did not
answer his question.
After asking for Felipe’s license and registration, the officers learned that
the car was insured and that Felipe did not have a state-issued driver’s
license, which is not a statutorily deportable offense. He had with him a
Mexican driver’s license and a passport. Stating that both the license and
passport were clearly fakes, the officers arrested Felipe for felony
possession of fraudulent documents. Felipe asked the officers if he could
call someone to get another form of identification, but they refused to let
him. The officers also said that they had received a report of a car like
Felipe’s in a nearby city and suspected him of transporting drugs in his car.
Felipe consented to a search, and the officers found nothing. Felipe was
taken to the county jail where, during the booking process, officers asked

71
ICE Secure Communities, Secure Communities Briefing #1: What Law Enforcement
Needs
to
Know,
YOUTUBE
(June
20,
2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUdeqg5TpHA&feature=youtube [hereinafter Briefing
#1].
72
Interview with anonymous immigration advocate in Davis, CA. This interview was
conducted under a mutual agreement of confidentiality to protect both the advocate and
“Felipe.” (Feb. 22, 2011) (names and other details have been changed in order to protect
anonymity).
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him about his immigration status. When he refused to answer, the officers
said they had already fingerprinted him and there was no record of his
immigration, so they “knew” he was undocumented.
The officers told Felipe that they were going to detain him until the next
day, when ICE would pick him up. They said they had placed an ICE hold
on him, so it would be best if he simply disclosed his status to the police
because ICE was going to deport him regardless. Fortunately for Felipe, he
had attended community education seminars for immigrants and understood
some of what the police were telling him. Felipe is also a fluent English
speaker, whereas many immigrants who are detained by police do not speak
English and are not assisted by a translator. While he was interrogated and
detained, Felipe felt like the officers were making fun of him. It was not
clear what they planned to do with Felipe; they said things to each other
like, “make it the maximum; he’s not getting out anyway.”
When Felipe’s mother called the jail and asked for his charges, the officer
said he could not disclose them because of Felipe’s ICE hold. As a result,
Felipe’s mother could not post bail. Felipe’s cousin learned of his arrest and
immediately drove to the jail, where a different officer told her she could
post a $20,000 bail. Felipe’s cousin was able to get him out on bail thirty
minutes before ICE arrived the following day. Felipe retained an
immigration attorney—in addition to a public defender—and the prosecutor
dropped the fraudulent document charges at his arraignment. The only
remaining charge was for driving without a license.
Felipe’s account of his arrest and detention illustrates what may have
been a racially—or ethnically—motivated stop. Had Felipe not had the help
of his cousin or been unable to post bail, he would have been torn away
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from his family and deported for a nonviolent crime. Unfortunately,
Felipe’s story is not unique.73
Though LLEAs should be responsible for discriminatory policing, DHS’s
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and ICE offer a
complaint procedure for state and LLEA enforcement of S-Comm.74
Through the complaint process after an investigation, CRCL will provide
recommendations, including the referral of matters to authorities such as
police oversight bodies or state attorneys general, identification of LLEA
officers who may require disciplinary investigation, and increased training
for officers on civil rights issues.75 However, unlike 287(g), through which
state and local law enforcement agencies can partner with ICE through an
MOA, “ICE need not have a formal partnership with the local law
enforcement agencies whose arrests trigger an information flow to ICE
through [S-Comm].”76 Consequently, CRCL may not have a “compulsory
process” for complainants, and may not have the ability to require state and
local law enforcement agencies to comply with CRCL/ICE investigations.
According to ICE and CRCL,
[the complaint investigation] process is useful to ensure that
DHS’s activities do not function as a conduit or incentive for
discriminatory policing, but it is important to note (and ICE will
state, if asked) that DHS/ICE oversight of Secure Communities
does not put DHS or ICE in a position to superintend all law

73
For other stories, see Costs and Consequences: The High Price of Policing Immigrant
OF
N.
CAL.
(Feb.
2011),
Communities,
ACLU
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/police_practices/costs_and_consequences.p
df.
74
See, e.g., Schlanger & Mead, supra note 66.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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enforcement conduct in jurisdictions where Secure Communities
has been activated.77
ICE further states that civil rights and/or community policing
mechanisms that may aide in fulfilling LLEAs’ responsibility to abide by
the constitutional obligation to avoid discriminatory policing have “nothing
to do with Secure Communities or immigration enforcement. Accordingly,
DHS will not discourage development or use of such mechanisms.”78 The
position ICE and CRCL seemingly take regarding discriminatory practices
suggests that government entities may either turn a blind eye to such
practices or may choose not to regulate states or LLEAs with discriminatory
practices. Additionally, CRCL consists of just six full-time employees and
has a FY 2011 budget of $1.2 million, which is less than one ten-thousandth
of DHS’s budget for 2011. With minimal capacity and limited resources,
CRCL lacks the ability to oversee the roughly 1,508 jurisdictions in which
S-Comm is activated. The Office would be stretched thin by handling
complaints from the 3,181 jurisdictions nationwide in which ICE plans to
implement the program.79
C. Deportation of Individuals Convicted of Nonviolent Crimes
As stated above, S-Comm leaves the fates of Level 2 and Level 3
offenders up to the discretion of ICE officials, and ICE statistics show that
the majority of individuals deported under S-Comm were arrested for
allegedly committing nonviolent crimes.80 For example, in Travis, Texas,

77

Id.
Id.
79
See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2011 BUDGET IN BRIEF, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib_fy2011.pdf.
80
CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48; see also Teresa A. Miller, Lessons Learned,
Lessons Lost: Immigration Enforcement’s Failed Experiment with Penal Severity, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217 (2010) (exploring how immigration enforcement followed the
78
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82 percent of S-Comm deportations are of noncriminals, while in San
Diego, California, the figure is 63 percent.81 These deportations may cause
more harm than good because undocumented immigrants play an integral
role in the US economy.82 Many undocumented people live their lives for
years as law-abiding workers, occupying jobs many US citizens would
not.83 If S-Comm’s stated goal is deporting “criminal aliens,” these numbers
suggest that ICE is not implementing the program in ways that meet that
goal.
ICE has made efforts to provide guidance for its officials making
deportation decisions, but these officials are still allowed full discretion. In
June 2011, ICE’s director, John Morton, issued a memorandum to ICE
personnel to provide direction as to the use of prosecutorial discretion to
ensure that immigration enforcement is focused on ICE’s priorities.84
Among the factors to be considered when exercising prosecutorial
discretion are a person’s criminal history, whether an individual poses a
clear risk to national security, and whether an individual has an “egregious
record” of immigration violations.85 However, Morton’s memo concludes
by stating that a favorable exercise of discretion by ICE personnel is not a
right, and that nothing in the memo “should be construed to prohibit the

“tough on crime” movement in the criminal justice system and contributed to the overincarceration of immigrants).
81
CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48.
82
See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (New York Univ. Press 2007); see also
Gordon H. Hanson, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The Economic Logic of Illegal
Immigration,
(April
2007),
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCMQFjAB&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FImmigrationCSR
26.pdf&ei=5849TqfwGO6rsAKTs9gD&usg=AFQjCNEH_n8oj23aWPfpThhDvPp57hBz
PA.
83
Id.
84
See Morton II, supra note 54.
85
Id.
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apprehension, detention, or removal of any alien unlawfully in the United
States or to limit the legal authority of ICE or any of its personnel to enforce
federal immigration law.”86 Because ICE personnel possess such broad
discretion, they may still choose to exercise it in favor of deporting more
individuals, rather than to focus solely on the most serious offenders.87
D. Wrongful Deportation
ICE files tens of thousands of cases in immigration courts each year and
many are either thrown out or declared futile, creating a backlog in the
courts and further highlighting ineffective government immigration
reforms.88 Over the past five years, immigration court judges (IJs)
terminated almost ninety-five thousand cases because there were no
grounds for removal.89 IJs granted relief in more than one hundred fifty
thousand cases during that same period of time. In total, nearly two hundred
fifty thousand individuals were affected by futile ICE filings in the FY
2006–10 period,90 and nearly 31 percent of ICE requests for deportation
were rejected during the last quarter of FY 2010, up from roughly 25
percent the previous year.91 In FY 2010, immigration courts in Los Angeles,
Miami, New York City, and Philadelphia turned down more than half of
ICE removal requests.92

86

See ICE, Letter from John Morton, supra note 39.
For more information regarding prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, see
Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. (June
29, 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/understanding-prosecutorialdiscretion-immigration-law.
88
See TRAC REPORTS, INC., ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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These statistics demonstrate that governmental efforts to remove
undocumented immigrants can be shockingly ineffective. Some failures
result from poorly designed immigration reform programs like S-Comm. In
fact, such programs may undermine public faith in the government’s ability
to implement effective changes,93 and may be costly and ineffective at both
the law enforcement and court levels. As such, this is another area where
both ICE and immigrants would benefit from the use of prosecutorial
discretion. Such discretion would help unclog the overburdened
immigration court system, lighten caseloads for ICE attorneys and
immigrant advocates alike, and prevent unnecessary removal proceedings
and deportations.
E. Impact on Domestic Violence Survivors and Their Families
Past repercussions of local immigration enforcement on noncitizen
domestic violence survivors suggest that S-Comm will also have a severely
detrimental effect on this vulnerable population.94 The negative impacts of
local immigration enforcement on survivors of domestic violence may
manifest in several ways. Most significantly, survivors of domestic violence
are occasionally arrested wrongfully as the “primary aggressor” in a
relationship, or through dual arrests.95 These survivors, already traumatized,

93

Id.; see also Sam Dolnick, Finished Probation in ‘80s, but Now Facing Deportation,
TIMES
CITY
ROOM
BLOG
(Oct.
29,
2010,
11:37
AM),
N.Y.
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/given-probation-in-80s-but-now-facingdeportation/?ref=todayspaper.
94
COLO. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Secure Communities Program
Fact Sheet, (Sept. 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter COLO. COALITION Fact Sheet];
Fact Sheet: Intersection of Domestic Violence and the Secure Communities Program
(Sept. 2010) (on file with author); see also Pendleton, supra note 63.
95
COLO. COALITION Fact Sheet, supra note 94; see also Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters:
Domestic Violence and Rural Difference, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 347, 403 (2008)
(discussing racial and ethnic barriers preventing immigrants and other women from
accessing law enforcement and other resources in rural areas); Ashley Arcidiacono,
Comment, Silencing the Voices of Battered Women: How Arizona’s New Anti-
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may then be detained by ICE. Secondly, domestic violence offenders often
report or threaten to report their victims to ICE or the police as a method of
further victimization.96 Offenders may separate or threaten to separate
survivors from their children through deportation or arrest, leaving children
in the abusers’ custody, which may be physically or emotionally harmful to
them.97 S-Comm provides an easy method for offenders to engage in such
behavior.
Survivors of domestic violence are already an at-risk group with
considerable inhibitions about calling law enforcement, and S-Comm may
further deter them from attempting to take protective measures.98 If their
communities equate police with ICE agents, immigrant survivors of abuse
will hesitate to call the police to notify them.99 This will also inhibit
domestic violence survivors from taking advantage of protective forms of
immigration relief like the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)100 that
might help them gain independence from their abusers.101 Additionally,
immigrant domestic violence survivors may not wish to report abuse if they

Immigration Law “SB1070” Prevents Undocumented Women from Seeking Relief Under
the Violence Against Women Act, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 173 (2010) (analyzing the effects
of several provisions of Ariz. S.B. 1070 that negatively affect battered undocumented
women); Michelle Decasas, Comment, Protecting Hispanic Women: The Inadequacy of
Domestic Violence Policy, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 56, 73 (2003) (discussing the
effects of state domestic violence mandatory arrest policies on undocumented and
immigrant women).
96
See BRENDA K. UEKERT ET AL., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SERVING
LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT (LEP) BATTERED WOMEN: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE
COURTS' CAPACITY TO PROVIDE PROTECTION ORDERS 21 (2006), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/216072.pdf.
97
Id.
98
See Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 870 (2009) (“The reluctance of victims to report and
testify about domestic violence makes domestic violence one of the hardest crimes to
prosecute.”).
99
See Idilbi, supra note 70, at 1729–33.
100
18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2006).
101
See Pendleton, supra note 63.
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believe that someone will turn their abusers in to ICE.102 S-Comm currently
has no protections in place for domestic violence survivors at the arrest
stage, thus providing no safety net for survivors who police arrest
simultaneously with their absuers.103 Without such protections, law
enforcement cannot adequately respond to all domestic violence crimes.104
As evidenced by proposed changes in Morton’s memos, ICE took note of
S-Comm’s potential to harm survivors of domestic violence. Both the
memo addressing prosecutorial discretion generally and the memo
addressing prosecutorial discretion in cases involving certain survivors,
witnesses, and plaintiffs address the need for particular care and
consideration in the cases of domestic violence survivors. In these cases,
ICE personnel should “exercise all appropriate prosecutorial discretion to
minimize any effect that immigration enforcement may have on the
willingness and ability of victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs to call police and
pursue justice.”105 Absent special circumstances, it is against ICE policy to
initiate removal proceedings against individuals known to be immediate
crime survivors or witnesses.106 ICE further reiterates that there are
provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)107 and VAWA
that provide protections for victims of domestic violence and other crimes.
Despite these reminders, immigrant rights advocacy groups remain

102

See Decasas, supra note 94 at 72.
For suggested protections, see infra p. 384.
104
COLO. COALITION Fact Sheet, supra note 94; see also Shankar Vedantam, Call for
Help Leads to Possible Deportation for Hyattsville Mother, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/01/AR2010110103073.html. For suggested steps for police
and prosecutors to take to encourage immigrant community members to report domestic
violence, see Pendleton, supra note 63 at 4–5.
105
Morton I, supra note 54.
106
Id.
107
Victims of Violence and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§101–13, 114
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
103
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skeptical that ICE and LLEAs will exercise proper discretion and
enforcement.108
F. Detention for More than Forty-Eight Hours
An ICE detainer allows an LLEA to maintain custody of an individual
after local jurisdiction ends.109 After ICE issues a detainer, transfer of
custody from LLEAs to ICE is not instantaneous. In theory, once ICE issues
a detainer, a locality should not hold an individual for more than forty-eight
hours before he or she is transferred to ICE.110 In practice, however, LLEAs
often unlawfully detain individuals until after the detainer expires.111
Unfortunately, unlike in criminal cases, indigent individuals in civil matters
do not have a recognized right to government-funded counsel.112 Many
individuals who are held on detainers are not aware that they have recourse
for wrongful detention, or even that LLEAs are detaining them
unlawfully.113 ICE detainers also place administrative burdens on LLEAs
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Brittney Nystrom, Cosmetic Changes Are Not Enough: Secure Communities Program
Needs
Sweeping
Reform,
IMMPOLITIC
BLOG
(July
19,
2011),
http://www.immigrationforum.org/blog/display/cosmetic-changes-are-not-enoughsecure-communities-program-needs-sweeping-r/.
109
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2010) (“Upon a determination by the Department to issue a detainer
for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall
maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.”).
110
Id.
111
In Sacramento County, for example, ICE sometimes takes more than forty-eight hours
to pick up detainees. In fact, one individual in a Sacramento detention facility had been
detained—as of March 2011—since September 2010 due to a pending ICE hold.
Telephone Interview with Jason Ramos, Deputy, Media Relations, Sacramento County
Sheriff (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Ramos Interview].
112
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 240(b)(4)(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1229(a)(4)(a) (2006).
113
IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, Immigration Detainers: A
Comprehensive Look, (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/justfacts/immigration-detainers-comprehensive-look. Some inmates held under detainer for
longer than forty-eight hours have been fortunate enough to obtain damages; see, e.g.,
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and expose them to potential civil liability for illegal arrests or for detaining
individuals for unlawful periods.
In June 2011, ICE attempted to address the issue of prolonged detention
by crafting a revised detainer form, which ICE now sends to LLEAs to
emphasize that state and local authorities must not detain an individual for
more than forty-eight hours.114 The new form requires that LLEAs provide
arrestees with a copy, which notifies the arrestee that he or she should not
be detained beyond forty-eight hours.115 The form provides the phone
number for the ICE Joint Intake Center, which arrestees may call if they
have a complaint relating to the detainer or civil rights or civil liberties
violations.116 ICE also plans to release a YouTube video briefing on ICE
detainers, which may elaborate on proper compliance with detainers.117
If ICE is able to ensure that LLEAs comply with the forty-eight hour
maximum detention, and if ICE follows through with investigations of
arrestees’ complaints, the agency may see some improvement in this area.
However, in localities with strained budgets and overcrowded detention
centers, LLEA vigilance in complying with custody limitations will likely
not be satisfactory.

Jacqueline Stevens, Deported New York City Resident Alleging Unlawful Detention Wins
$145,000 Settlement from NYC and So Can You!, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS BLOG
(Sept. 9, 2009, 6:05AM), http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2009/09/deportednew-york-city-resident.html; Third Amended Complaint, Cecil O. Harvey v. City of New
York, et al., No. 07 Civ. 0343 (NG)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.lawso.ucsb.edu/faculty/jstevens/113/HarveyComplaint1008.pdf.
114
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETAINER—NOTICE OF ACTION (June
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigrationdetainer-form.pdf.
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See Briefing #1, supra note 71.
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G. Improper Implementation
Dealing with immigration “crime” is a matter distinct from detecting
traffic violations or handling serious crimes such as robbery or murder.
Most regulations governing traditional law enforcement are significantly
less complex than immigration laws.118 State law enforcement officials are
not likely to receive special training in immigration enforcement, which
puts legal immigrants at risk for being mistaken as undocumented.119
Further, ICE iterates time and again that S-Comm places no new burden on
LLEAs. In fact, when LLEAs take on the burden of immigration
enforcement, resources traditionally available for normal crime prevention
are no longer at LLEAs’ disposal.120
Neither DHS nor Congress oversees S-Comm’s implementation
satisfactorily,121 though greater oversight may arise after ICE’s June 2011
changes to the program. In 2010, the ACLU requested that the DHS Office
of Inspector General audit the program for racial profiling and other abuses,
as well as compliance with ICE’s priorities.122 Beginning in June 2011, ICE
and CRCL started examining S-Comm data to identify LLEAs that may
engage in “improper police practices,” in an effort to improve S-Comm’s
implementation.123 Also in June 2011, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano
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See Chandler, supra note 64, at 233.
See id.
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See Petition by Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network to Sec’y Napolitano, Dep’t of
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(last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
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See ACLU Statement, supra note 3.
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http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=682235; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Secure
Communities: Statistical Monitoring, (last revised Nov. 16, 2011),
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created the Task Force on Secure Communities,124 a subcommittee of the
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC).125 The task force released
its findings and recommendations in September 2011, including criticism of
S-Comm’s failure to adequately target serious offenders and reduce
confusion in the program’s implementation.126
While greater federal government oversight might address some of the
detrimental effects of S-Comm, the federal government may not have the
authority to enforce the program. The following section considers the
appropriate roles of federal and local governments in immigration
regulation and enforcement—and whether the federal government has that
authority.

IV. IMMIGRATION IS NO LONGER AN EXCLUSIVELY FEDERAL ISSUE:
FEDERALISM AND THE AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE
IMMIGRATION REFORM
The Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution reserves powers not
expressly delegated to the federal government for the states.127 Although the
power to regulate immigration does not appear explicitly in the
Constitution, it is generally understood that this power is reserved for the

124

Notably, five members of the nineteen-member task force resigned in disagreement
with the rest of the committee, including a retired police chief and union members. Elise
Foley, Secure Communities Task Force Releases Recommendations, Five Members
POST,
Sept.
16,
2011,
Resign
in
Disagreement,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/16/secure-communities-taskforce_n_966318.html.
125
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES, FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
4
(Sept.
2011),
available
at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/SComm%20Task%20Force%2
0Report%20091611.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
126
Id. at 11–14.
127
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
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federal government under the “Naturalization Clause”—Article I, Section 8,
Clause 4 of the Constitution.128 Because the power of immigration
regulation and enforcement is set aside for the federal government, the
federal government cannot co-opt state resources for enforcement.
During the early 1990s, the federal government crossed the line
separating state and federal powers. In 1993, Congress enacted the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act),129 amending the 1968 Gun
Control Act.130 The Brady Act called for interim provisions that instructed
local law enforcement officials to participate in background checks required
under the Gun Control Act.131 The federal government enlisted chief law
enforcement officials (CLEOs) in administering federal laws, a
responsibility that belongs to the executive branch.132 On certiorari, in
Printz v. United States, the US Supreme Court held that the Brady Act’s
imposition of a background check requirement on CLEOs was

128

The clause states, “Congress shall have Power . . . To establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 4. This clause is problematic because federal
immigration law addresses much more than just naturalization. See Chandler, supra note
64, at 210. Another potential call for state and local immigration enforcement may be
INA § 103(a)(10). That regulation grants the Attorney General (AG) the power to
authorize, but not to compel, state and local officers to enforce immigration law if he or
she determines that an “actual or imminent mass influx of aliens arriving . . . presents
urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response.” 8 U.S.C. § 110 (2010).
If the AG concludes that there is such an influx, he or she “may authorize any State or
local law enforcement officer, with the consent of the head of the department, agency, or
establishment under whose jurisdiction the individual is serving, to perform or exercise
any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this Act or regulations
issued thereunder upon officers or employees of the Service.” Id. For a history of
immigration in North America, see James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming
the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and
Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 35 (2010).
129
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
130
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2011).
131
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997).
132
Id.
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unconstitutional.133 The Court also held that the law improperly co-opted
state officers to enforce federal regulations and eroded the system of “dual
sovereignty,” undermining the separation of powers.134 This dual
sovereignty enables states to retain autonomy, even though many powers
are reserved to the federal government.135
Further, Printz prohibits the federal government from ordering state and
local governments to perform certain tasks.136 In Printz, the government
described the executive branch’s historical use of state executive officers to
administer federal programs. This description noted that the first
Congresses enacted statutes requiring state courts to record citizenship
applications, register aliens pursuing naturalization, issue certificates of
registry, and send to the secretary of state summaries of such applications
and other naturalization records.137 Printz’s progeny stated that the
executive branch imposed these obligations with the states’ consent and
could not be enforced without it.138 Judges may enforce federal law;
Congress, however, is bound by the Constitution and cannot force state
officers to carry out federal mandates, even for “limited, non-policymaking
help in enforcing [such] law[s].”139
In the majority opinion of Printz, Justice Scalia cited New York v. United
States for the proposition that Congress cannot require states to enforce or
enact a federal regulatory program.140 Printz expanded that prohibition by

133

Id. at 935.
Id.
135
Id. at 899.
136
Id. at 904.
137
Id. at 905–06.
138
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519–20 (1883).
139
Printz, 521 U.S. at 927.
140
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
134

In providing for a stronger central government, therefore, the Framers
explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to
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denying Congress the ability to evade commandeering issues by directly
enlisting state officers to enforce or enact federal programs.141 Justice Scalia
wrote:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the
States to address particular problems, nor command the States’
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether
policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty.142
By denying counties the ability to opt out of S-Comm, is the government
implicitly issuing a directive requiring the states to address the “problem” of
immigration? Do USCIS and ICE have the power to make a program like SComm mandatory—or the ability to command state officers to enforce or
administer such a regulatory program?143 According to HSAC’s Task Force,

regulate individuals, not States. As we have seen, the Court has consistently
respected this choice. We have always understood that even where Congress
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting
certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts. . . . The allocation of power contained in the Commerce
Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce
directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’
regulation of interstate commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
141
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
142
Id.
143
Id. In 1996, section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) encouraged information sharing between state and local
entities and federal entities, providing:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal,
State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way
restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
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“DHS should clarify the statutory authority it relies upon to assert that local
participation in Secure Communities is mandatory.”144 Because the federal
government cannot commandeer state actors, courts may have to probe the
issues present in Printz as they relate to S-Comm.145
ICE is adamant that, under S-Comm, “state and local law enforcement
officers are not deputized, do not enforce immigration law, and are not
tasked with any additional responsibilities,” and that “only federal officers
make immigration decisions, and they do so only after a completely
independent decision by state and local law enforcement to arrest an
individual for a criminal violation of state law separate and apart from any
violations of immigration law.”146 However, in practice, not all states and
LLEAs find the distinction to be so clear.
Those concerned about separation of powers have raised questions about
the fuzzy line between state and federal duties relating to immigration
enforcement through S-Comm. District of Columbia Councilmember Jim
Graham (D-Ward 1) expressed his disappointment over localities’ inability
to opt out of S-Comm due to the “blurred line” between activities conducted
by the Metropolitan Police Department and immigration officers.147 Graham

8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2010). However, the constitutionality of § 642(a) has not been litigated
fully. See Chandler, supra note 64.
144
See TASK FORCE, supra note 125, at 15.
145
287(g) agreements, however, allow the government and localities to curtail the issue
of commandeering by entering in to memorandums of understanding. For more on 287(g)
agreements, see infra p. 363.
146
Secure Communities: Get the Facts, US IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF.,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
147
Shankar Vedantam, Local Jurisdictions Find They Can’t Opt Out of Federal
Immigration
Enforcement
Program,
WASH.
POST,
Sept.
30,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2010/09/30/ST2010093007299.html [hereinafter Vedantam, Local
Jurisdictions].
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and the rest of the council sponsored a bill in May 2010 to opt out of SComm.148 Graham stated:
We had a bright line, and that has increased trust and confidence in
our police among immigrant communities. That will now vanish. .
. . It makes the local police department an arm of the federal
immigration authority in a way that has not been true in the District
of Columbia. . . . It also distracts scarce police resources—they
have to hold people until ICE can get to them. We want those
resources devoted to crime-fighting.149
Graham’s concerns speak not only to the federalism issues S-Comm
implicates, but also to the state resources that LLEAs potentially divert to
the federal program at the expense of other law enforcement tasks.
Despite political and social disapproval of S-Comm’s “blurred line,”
courts are not likely to invalidate S-Comm under Printz. S-Comm may be
“yet another example of local and federal agencies working together
effectively to keep our communities safe.”150 Critics of local enforcement of
immigration laws may be “too quick to read local actions directed toward
immigrants as a subset of the national immigration controversy while
ignoring the underlying local issues involved.”151 When courts maintain the
belief that only federal reform can solve local immigration problems, they
may unintentionally limit state and local responses.152 Such responses must

148

See Tim Craig, D.C. Council: Boycott Arizona, Don’t Share Arrest Data with Feds,
POST
D.C.
WIRE
BLOG
(May
4,
2010,
11:27
AM),
WASH.
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2010/05/dc_council_boycott_arizona_don.html.
149
Vedantam, Local Jurisdictions, supra note 147. “Of course, state regulation not
congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the
country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.”
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976).
150
Desoto County News Release, supra note 10.
151
Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619,
1624 (2008).
152
See id.; see also Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 609–10 (2008) (discussing roles of all levels of
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strike a careful balance to maintain a constitutionally proper separation of
powers under Printz.
In light of S-Comm, localities may or may not be mere creatures of the
state.153 If a state opts to implement S-Comm, must localities also
implement it? Another important concern is whether the federal government
should subject immigration enforcement to centralized control. Centralized
control may allow for greater uniformity of the law’s substance and
enforcement, better oversight, and greater efficiency than decentralized
control.154 In contrast, decentralized control allows localities to better cater
to the interests, attitudes, and needs of their communities, while creating a
platform for experimenting with evolving enforcement systems.155

government in immigration enforcement in a “de facto [federal, state, and local] multisovereign regime”); see also Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously,
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 72 (2007) (“For better and for worse, effective federal
immigration enforcement often depends upon the extensive participation of state and
local officials. This is particularly true regarding enforcement against immigrants who
have been convicted of crimes in this country.”).
153
See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
154
See Chandler, supra note 64, at 231.
155
See id. While the federalism debate surrounding immigration regulation presents an
opportunity for reform, the United States is in need of broader immigration policy
reform. The federal government should not
dragoon states or localities into enforcement of immigration policies with
which they disagree. States and localities should decide for themselves how to
weigh the advantages of enforcing federal immigration policy—criminal or
civil—against its significant costs. I would be much more trusting of local
governments’ decisions to enforce federal immigration laws if they would give
up their qualified immunity for mistakes that occur as a result and would spell
out for the citizenry the heightened risks they face when those predisposed to
conventional crime can take advantage of immigrant fears of cooperating with
law enforcement.
Id. at 242. For an interesting take on immigration reform, see Jennifer Gordon, Workers
Without Borders, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2009, at A27, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/opinion/10gordon.html; see also Keith Aoki & John
Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and
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However, any deference to local judgment should be narrowly tailored for
the purpose of opting out of S-Comm. Sweeping deference to local
governments could lead to sweeping permission across the country for
programs like Arizona SB 1070.156 Among other things, SB 1070 prevents
state and county officials and agencies from adopting policies that limit
enforcement of federal immigration law, and it requires that state and
county officials and agencies make reasonable attempts to determine the
immigration status of persons who come in to “lawful” contact with
LLEAs.157
On May 26, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled on a state immigration law in
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.158 In that case, the Court held that an
Arizona law prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented immigrants
(the Legal Arizona Workers Act) was not preempted by federal law because
it falls within an exemption established by the 1986 federal Immigration
Reform and Control Act.159 In its analysis of applied preemption, the Court
pointed to precedents establishing that “a high threshold must be met if a
state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal
Act,” and determined that that threshold was not met in Whiting.160 The

“Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering Whether “Immigration
Regionalism” Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1 (2010)
(contemplating the pros and cons of “immigration regionalism” as a form of immigration
reform).
156
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
157
Id.
158
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (internal
citations omitted).
159
Id.
160
Id.; see also Mark Walsh, Raising Arizona High Court Eyes State’s Punishments for
Hiring Unauthorized Aliens, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2010, at 20.
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holding in Whiting suggests that the Court may be willing to uphold other
state and local immigration enforcement initiatives.161
A. 287(g) Agreements and MOAs
Some critics view S-Comm as an expansive version of 287(g)
agreements. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
which Congress passed in 1995, permits state and LLEAs to enter into
agreements with the federal government via MOAs.162 These MOAs allow
appropriately trained officers to carry out immigration law activities, such
as identification, processing, and detention of undocumented immigrants, in
addition to their regular work.163 The executive branch supervises state
officers acting under 287(g) agreements, and state employees or officers
acting under 287(g) authority shall be considered “to be acting under color
of [f]ederal authority” for liability purposes.164 Critics argue that officers are
being commandeered, but this assertion would be easily challenged because
officers acting pursuant to 287(g) agreements perform their functions as
federal actors.165 Further, the United States Code affirmatively states that
287(g) does not compel state officials to report anyone’s immigration status
to the US Attorney General (AG) or even to cooperate with the AG in
identifying, arresting, or removing undocumented immigrants.166

161

Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground Zero for
the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in
America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 12 (2011).
162
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). This law enables states and localities to enforce immigration laws
pursuant to a signed agreement with the US Attorney General, but cannot be construed to
require states or localities to sign such an agreement.
163
See id.
164
“An officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State shall be subject to
the directions and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
165
See McThomas, supra note 45.
166
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). A staff attorney with a social justice organization in North
Carolina coordinates the organization’s immigrant rights work. He believes that the
overlapping jurisdiction between 287(g) agreements and S-Comm creates difficulty in
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ICE has not established the extent of its guidance over 287(g), although
the law calls for ICE supervision of state and local officials. As a result,
ICE field officials have different understandings of the nature and extent of
their responsibilities as supervisors. For example, one official stated that the
agency does not directly supervise LLEAs in the 287(g) program.167 In
contrast, another ICE official said that ICE supervisors provide “frontline
support” for the program.168
For the first several years of S-Comm’s existence, it was unclear in what
capacity LLEAs acted when they sent fingerprints to IFAIS. Were they state
actors or federal actors? Did LLEAs’ acts fall within the doctrine of
“concurrent enforcement,”169 which is authorized only where “state
enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory interests”?170 ICE
has since clarified that the power to enforce immigration rests exclusively
with DHS.171

determining which of the cases that come to him are a result of 287(g) enforcement and
which are S-Comm cases. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Attorney (Oct. 7, 2010,
10:00 AM) (Anonymity is preserved here at the request of the attorney) [hereinafter
Interview with NC Attorney]; Ramos Interview, supra note 111.
167
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-381T, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
CONTROLS OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 4 (Mar. 4, 2009) (testimony
of Richard M. Stana, Dir., Homeland Sec. & Justice), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09381t.pdf.
168
Id. For more information regarding the effectiveness of 287(g), see IMMIGR. POLICY
CTR., AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, GIVING FACTS A FIGHTING CHANCE: ANSWERS TO THE
TOUGHEST
IMMIGRATION
QUESTIONS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Giving_Facts_a_Fighting_Cha
nce_100710.pdf.
169
Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 218 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S.Ct. 2958
(2011).
170
Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by
Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
171
See Briefing #1, supra note 71.
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Regardless of the role LLEAs play when participating in S-Comm, the
program’s activities must be funded. The next section discusses who should
provide this funding.
B. The Financial Impact of Implementing S-Comm
ICE planned to spend $1.4 billion of congressional allowances in FY
2009 on “criminal alien enforcement,”172 but it is unclear how much of the
funding localities received specifically for implementing S-Comm. Though
ICE budgeted $200 million for “Secure Communities/Comprehensive
Identification and Removal of Criminal Aliens (SC/CIRCA)” in 2010, its
enacted budget does not detail specifically how it would allocate those
funds. The budget does state that $43.5 million of new funding, and fortysix full-time employees, were allocated to S-Comm.173 The US Department
of Justice’s FY 2011 Budget Request calls for an $11 million increase to its
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) budget, which will
support hiring more IJs and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) attorneys
needed to address an increase in caseload resulting from DHS programs
such as S-Comm.174
Even though DHS and ICE claim that S-Comm does not impose costs on
localities, and that local sheriffs are just agreeing to hold individuals until
ICE can pick them up, the individuals held by LLEAs pursuant to detainers
are not actually in ICE custody. While these individuals remain in LLEA

172
U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., Secure Communities Program Presentations
(2009),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiespresentations.pdf.
173
ICE Fiscal Year 2010 Enacted Budget, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF. (Nov. 5,
2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/doc/2010budgetfactsheet.doc;
see also Nancy Lofholm, Program to Find Criminal Illegal Immigrants Hampered in
POST,
July
6,
2011,
Colo.
By
Pricey
Equipment,
DENVER
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_18415336.
174
US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 BUDGET REQUEST, available at
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011factsheets/pdf/enforce-immigration-laws.pdf.
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custody, those LLEAs must use their resources to detain them. According to
Anjali Bhargava, former deputy county counsel at the Santa Clara County
Counsel’s Office, ICE provides no “trickle down” funding specifically for
communities implementing S-Comm.175 LLEAs may nevertheless be able to
recuperate some of their expenses via the State Criminal Alien Assistance
Program (SCAAP).176 SCAAP provides federal reimbursements to states
and localities that have borne costs for detaining undocumented immigrants
with at least one state or local felony conviction, or two misdemeanor
convictions, for at least four or more consecutive days.177
While SCAAP benefits LLEAs, it not likely an effective solution to the
problem of funding S-Comm. LLEAs incur greater costs as the number of
required detainers increases. Over time, a larger amount of LLEAs’
resources will be devoted to detaining undocumented individuals.178 While
reimbursement may be secured through SCAAP, localities may have to
advance the money and hope for repayment in the future. Additionally,
jurisdictions typically request more in reimbursements than SCAAP can
pay.179 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that SCAAP
payments to the four states with the highest number of SCAAP
undocumented immigrants in FY 2003 covered less than 25 percent of the

175

Telephone Interview with Anjali Bhargava, former Deputy Cnty. Counsel, Santa Clara
Cnty. Counsel’s Office (Oct. 5, 2010).
176
Bureau of Justice Assistance, State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP),
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/scaap.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter SCAAP]. For a discussion of funding issues present in 287(g)
Agreement enforcement, see Idilbi, supra note 70, at 1743–41.
177
SCAAP, supra note 176.
178
For more information on the economic ramifications of immigration enforcement at
the local level, see Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of Local
Immigration Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 485, 518 (2010).
179
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT
07-07, COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS
UNITED
STATES
(Jan.
2007),
available
at
FROM
THE
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/a0707/final.pdf.
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approximate cost to detain those individuals.180 In FY 2003, SCAAP
payments covered just 12 percent of estimated detention costs for
California, 14 percent for Arizona, 7 percent for Florida, and 24 percent for
New York.181
State governments are also unable to adequately cover expenses that
LLEAs incur implementing S-Comm. For example, California’s
constitution requires that the state reimburse local governments for
expenditures they incur in implementing legislative- or state-agencymandated programs.182 Because S-Comm is a federal program, however, the
state may not be constitutionally required to fund it.183 For example,
California’s constitution only mandates funding when the state adopts a
regulation pursuant to a federal mandate and has no choice in the manner of
its execution.184 Because of the mixed messages regarding whether SComm is a federal mandate, this constitutional provision may or may not
apply. If California’s constitutional provision does apply, California
counties would be able to appeal to the Commission of State Mandates to
request funding. As it stands, California counties do not receive state
funding for implementing S-Comm and, as mentioned above, SCAAP

180

Id.
Id.
182
“Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher
level of service on any local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to
reimburse that local government for the costs of the program or increased level of service
[with the exception of] (1) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected.
(2) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime (3)
Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations
initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975.” CAL. CONST. art.
13B, § 6.
183
See Cnty of Los Angeles v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (Ct. App.
2003); Cnty of Los Angeles v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304 (Ct.
App. 1995), holding modified sub nom; Dep’t of Fin. v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 122
Cal. Rptr. 2d 447 (Ct. App. 2002); Hayes v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d
547 (Ct. App. 1992).
184
CAL. CONST. art. 13B, § 6.
181
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reimbursement fails to cover the entire cost of detaining undocumented
immigrants at the LLEA level.
Though immigration has historically been a federal issue, state and local
governments have varying methods of addressing and implementing
immigration enforcement. As local governments take on immigration
regulation tasks, thus incurring risks and financial burdens, the federal
government toes the line between commandeering and allowing optional
compliance with immigration regulation at the local level. Local
compliance via 287(g) has its costs, and some localities may wish to refuse
to enforce immigration all together. The following section will discuss a
unique approach for limiting immigration enforcement at the local level.

V. SANCTUARY CITIES AS A METHOD OF RESISTANCE TO S-COMM
In the 1980s, many US cities adopted “sanctuary city” policies or
designations designed to protect undocumented immigrants.185 During that
time, churches across the United States sheltered Central Americans
escaping civil wars in their home countries.186 The term “sanctuary city”
may describe municipalities that have adopted “sanctuary, non-cooperation,
or confidentiality policies for undocumented residents, which may be
viewed as inclusionary types of laws.”187 Such policies may be de jure or de
facto and may be manifested by prohibiting use of municipal funds for
enforcing federal immigration laws or by requiring municipal employees to
refrain from inquiring about an individual’s immigration status.188 When

185

Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 135 (2008).
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H (1989), available at
http://www.sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1069 [hereinafter ADMIN. CODE].
187
Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 573, 577 (2010).
188
Some critics believe that sanctuary city efforts may have inadvertently helped open the
door for states and localities to enforce immigration. The idea of sanctuary cities may
have been better packaged as a public safety initiative. By agreeing not to participate in
186
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LLEAs refuse to enforce immigration laws, are they enforcing a
“sanctuary” policy, or are they simply refusing to take on a task performed
historically by the federal government? Though the answer varies,
sanctuary cities like San Francisco may have a stronger argument for opting
out of programs like S-Comm.
A. San Francisco’s “Sanctuary”
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors first declared the city a
sanctuary city in 1989, prohibiting city employees from assisting ICE with
arrests or immigration investigations unless required by warrant or state or
federal law.189 Representing one of the governments that “[has] stood firmly
against repressive immigration proposals in Congress and immigration raids
that separate families,” former San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom issued
an executive order in February 2007 asking city departments to develop
training and procedures on the city’s Sanctuary Ordinance.190
San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance prohibits any San Francisco city or
county agency, commission, department, employee, or officer from using
any city funds or resources to assist in the enforcement of federal
immigration law, or the dissemination or gathering of information about the
immigration status of persons in the city or county unless required by state
or federal regulation, statute, or court decision.191 Such assistance includes
cooperating or assisting, in an individual’s official capacity, with any

activities such as assisting ICE with arrests or immigration investigations, undocumented
immigrants will likely be more willing to provide information to police and comply with
local law enforcement investigations. See Dean Johnson Interview, supra note 60.
189
ADMIN. CODE, supra note 185.
190
Id. In 2007, Newsom also vowed to discourage federal officials from performing
immigration raids. Peter Fimrite, Newsom Says S.F. Won’t Help with Raids, S.F. CHRON.,
April
23,
2007,
at
B-1,
available
at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/04/23/BAGOHPDLLT1.DTL#ixzz11t698wiI.
191
ADMIN. CODE, supra note 185, § 2.
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USCIS detention, investigation, or arrest procedure dealing with alleged
violations of federal immigration law provisions.192
The ordinance, however, does not prohibit (nor should it be construed as
prohibiting) law enforcement officers from identifying and reporting
persons pursuant to federal or state regulation or law who, after being
booked for the alleged commission of a felony, are in custody and suspected
of violating civil provisions of immigration laws.193 Further, the ordinance
does not preclude San Francisco County or City actors194 from reporting
arrests of previously convicted felons to USCIS, cooperating with USCIS
requests for information about convicted felons, or reporting information as
per federal or state statute, court decision, or regulation.195 Perhaps the most
important protection that the ordinance provides is its prohibition against
county or city employees, officers, or law enforcement agencies stopping,

192

Such assistance also includes, but is not limited to:
(b) Assisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity, with any investigation,
surveillance or gathering of information conducted by foreign governments,
except for cooperation related to an alleged violation of City and County, State
or federal criminal laws.
(c) Requesting information about, or disseminating information regarding, the
immigration status of any individual, or conditioning the provision of services
or benefits by the City and County of San Francisco upon immigration status,
except as required by federal or State statute or regulation, City and County
public assistance criteria, or court decision.
(d) Including on any application, questionnaire or interview form used in
relation to benefits, services or opportunities provided by the City and County
of San Francisco any question regarding immigration status other than those
required by federal or State statute, regulation or court decision.
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questioning, detaining, or arresting individuals exclusively because of their
immigration status or national origin.196
Long-time San Francisco sheriff Michael Hennessey has consistently
been outspoken in his criticism of San Francisco’s potential implementation
of S-Comm. In May 2010, Hennessey wrote a letter to then-California
Attorney General Jerry Brown requesting assistance in opting out of SComm.197 Hennessey’s concern was that S-Comm conflicted with San
Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance.198 He stated that his department had
“delivered” more than 3,100 people to ICE, and that he intended to continue
reporting “foreign-born individuals” charged with felonies, or having a
felony, or having “previous ICE contact in their criminal histories,” directly
to ICE.199 After a meeting with ICE officials on November 9, 2010, San
Francisco did not opt out of S-Comm due to ICE’s explanation that counties
cannot prevent the data sharing necessary for S-Comm’s implementation.200
At the same meeting, ICE’s S-Comm director, David Venturella, reportedly
stated that LLEAs were not required to respond to detainers.201 Under
Sheriff Hennessey’s latest policy, undocumented immigrants arrested for

196
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Letter from Michael Hennessey, Sheriff, San Francisco (May 18, 2010), available at
http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/Sheriff-Hennessey-Ltr-Opting-Out-of-S-1Comm-5-18-2010.pdf.
198
Id.
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Id. According to the US Census Bureau, 34.4 percent of San Francisco County
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CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06075.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2011).
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Elise Foley, San Francisco won’t opt out of Secure Communities, THE WASH.
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 9, 2010, http://washingtonindependent.com/103084/san-franciscowont-opt-out-of-secure-communities.
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misdemeanors will not be held in LLEA custody while ICE checks their
status under S-Comm.202
B. Congressional Restriction on Sanctuary Cities
In 1996, Congress enacted a law stating that state and local government
entities may not be prohibited from sending information to or receiving
information from the INS (now USCIS) regarding individuals’ immigration
statuses.203 The “clear target” of provisions like this was non-enforcement
attempts by localities like San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance.204 The city
of New York challenged Congress’s “anti-sanctuary measure” shortly after
it was enacted.205 The court in City of New York v. United States held that
Section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act) and Section 642 of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) did
not force state or local governments to administer federal programs in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.206 According to the court, New York
City’s sovereignty argument asked the court to

202

SF Sheriff Plans to Defy Fed’s Secure Communities Program, (KTVU television
broadcast, May 30, 2011), available at http://www.ktvu.com/news/28067653/detail.html.
203
8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2010).
204
Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619,
1635–36 (2008). Notably, the Loophole Elimination and Verification Enforcement Act
(LEAVE), authored by former US Senator Gary Miller (R-Calif.), would forbid sanctuary
cities from obtaining funds from the DOJ and DHS for immigration enforcement. See
Joshua Rhett Miller, DOJ Gave Millions to Illegal Immigrant ‘Sanctuaries,’ Report
Finds, FOX NEWS (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/12/doj-gavemillions-sanctuary-communities-report-finds/.
205
See Su, supra note 204.
206
City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999). Both the Welfare
Reform Act and IIRIRA prohibited state and local governments from restricting
employees from voluntarily providing information about individuals’ immigration status
to INS.
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[t]urn the Tenth Amendment’s shield against the federal
government’s using state and local governments to enact and
administer federal programs into a sword allowing states and
localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal
programs. If Congress may not forbid states from outlawing even
voluntary cooperation with federal programs by state and local
officials, states will at times have the power to frustrate
effectuation of some programs. Absent any cooperation at all from
local officials, some federal programs may fail or fall short of their
goals unless federal officials resort to legal processes in every
routine or trivial matter, often a practical impossibility.207
The City of New York decision and the 1996 law demonstrate
congressional and judicial discouragement of local resistance to federal
immigration laws. However, sanctuary policies and policies such as Los
Angeles’s Special Order Number 40 still withstand challenges.
C. Los Angeles’s Special Order Number 40
In 1979 the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners adopted a
policy that lead to Special Order Number 40, which states that Los Angeles
Police Department Officers shall not “initiate police action with the
objective of discerning the alien status of a person. Officers shall not arrest
or book person [sic] for [illegal entry].”208 In Sturgeon v. Bratton, a
California Court of Appeals found that Special Order Number 40 did not
conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which addresses “voluntary” exchange of
information between government entities or officials and federal
immigration enforcement agencies.209
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Special Order No. 40, Office of the Chief of Police of Los Angeles (Nov. 27, 1979),
available at http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/pdf_view/44798.
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Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1411 (2009).
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Local choices like implementing sanctuary ordinances and Special Order
Number 40 evince localities’ desire to have a say as to whether they enforce
immigration laws. As such, self-declared sanctuary cities have a stronger
argument for opting out of S-Comm. The next section will discuss if and
how cities like San Francisco might be able to opt out of the program.

VI. OPTING OUT AS A SOLUTION FOR CITIES AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Over the past year-and-a-half, states and localities have had difficulty
determining ICE’s stance regarding whether they can opt out of S-Comm.
On September 7, 2010, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano sent
a letter to Zoe Lofgren, member of the US House of Representatives (DCA) and chair of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, explaining the conditions
under which an LLEA may opt out of S-Comm.210 Napolitano’s letter stated
that
[a] local law enforcement agency that does not wish to participate
in the Secure Communities deployment plan must formally notify
the Assistant Director for the Secure Communities program, David
Venturella. . . . The agency must also notify the appropriate state
identification bureau by mail, facsimile, or e-mail. If a local law
enforcement agency chooses not be activated in the Secure
Communities deployment plan, it will be the responsibility of that
agency to notify its local ICE field office of suspected criminal
aliens.211

210

Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to the Hon. Zoe Lofgren,
Member, US House of Representatives and Chair, House Subcomm. on Immigr.,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Int’l Law, and Committee on the Judiciary
(Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/ZLofgren_Response-from-USDOJ-and-DHS.09.08.2010.pdf.
211
Id.
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ICE described a similar opt-out procedure in a memo released in late
August 2010.212 On September 8, 2010, Assistant US Attorney General
Ronald Weich responded to a letter from Lofgren asking for a “clear
explanation of how local law enforcement agencies may opt out of Secure
Communities by having the fingerprints they collect and submit to the SIBs
checked against criminal, but not immigration, databases.”213 Weich’s letter
echoed Napolitano’s instructions.214
Despite these official responses, local jurisdictions are finding that they
cannot opt out of S-Comm.215 An anonymous senior ICE official stated that
Secure Communities is not based on state or local cooperation in
federal law enforcement. The program’s foundation is information
sharing between FBI and ICE. State and local law enforcement
agencies are going to continue to fingerprint people and those
fingerprints are forwarded to FBI for criminal checks. ICE will
take immigration action appropriately.216
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Elise Foley, ICE Changes Its Mind on Secure Communities Opt-Out, WASH.
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1, 2010, http://washingtonindependent.com/99382/ice-changes-itsmind-on-secure-communities-opt-out. The memo stated:
If a jurisdiction does not wish to activate on its scheduled date in the Secure
Communities deployment plan, it must formally notify its state identification
bureau and ICE in writing (email, letter or facsimile). Upon receipt of that
information, ICE will request a meeting with federal partners, the jurisdiction,
and the state to discuss any issues and come to a resolution, which may include
adjusting the jurisdiction’s activation date in or removing the jurisdiction from
the deployment plan.
Id.
Letter from Ronald Weich, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Zoe
Lofgren, Chair, House Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l
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As a result, the only option for a local jurisdiction to opt out of S-Comm
is if the state declines to send fingerprints to the FBI, thus withholding them
from ICE.217 Because prosecutors and law enforcement need to know the
criminal histories of arrestees, this method is unrealistic. The ICE official
said that municipalities could, however, choose to have immigration
authorities withhold the reason for someone’s detention, but those
municipalities would still be required to detain the individual.218
In October 2010, CCR, NDLON, and the Kathryn O. Greenberg
Immigration Justice Clinic of the Cardozo School of Law filed suit in
federal court alleging ICE’s noncompliance with a FOIA request and
seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ICE to release documents explaining
how communities can opt out of S-Comm.219 At that time, Arlington,
Virginia, San Francisco, and Santa Clara, California, had all submitted
formal requests to opt out of the program.220 In February 2011, CCR,
NDLON, and the Justice Clinic released S-Comm documents they obtained
through the FOIA suit.221 Their guide to the documents, and the documents
themselves, chronicle the confusion regarding opting out of S-Comm, and
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Marcos Restrepo, Immigrant Rights Groups File Injunction for Secure Communities
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220
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Ctr.
for
Const. Rights et al., Preliminary Briefing Guide: Newly Released Documents Chronicle
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reiterate that, although ICE publicly announced that S-Comm is a
“mandatory” program, the agency remained unclear about a legal basis for
mandatory implementation.222
On July 6, 2011, CCR, Cardozo, and NDLON issued a fact sheet
outlining more information extracted from their FOIA requests. This fact
sheet details the FBI’s intention that S-Comm be a part of its Next
Generation Identification Project (NGI).223 NGI aims to reduce criminal and
terrorist activities by expanding criminal history information biometric
identification services.224 NGI will include digital photographs for
automated facial recognition scans, as well as iris scans and voice
identification.225 According to the fact sheet prepared by CCR, Cardozo,
and NDLON, the FOIA documents demonstrate that the FBI, rather than
DHS, was the first agency to seek mandatory implementation of S-Comm—
and that the FBI fears that states’ ability to opt out of S-Comm may
promote states’ questioning their participation in NGI.226
ICE Director John Morton issued a memorandum on August 5, 2011
declaring that an MOA is not required for any jurisdiction to activate or
operate S-Comm.227 This demonstrates the federal government’s investment
in implementing S-Comm mandatorily, even if the program exists to the
detriment of state and local laws. Morton stated that “[o]nce a state or local
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law enforcement agency voluntarily submits fingerprint data to the federal
government, no agreement with the state is legally necessary for one part of
the federal government to share it with another part.”228 Consequently, ICE
will terminate all existing S-Comm MOAs.229 Chris Newman, the legal
director of NDLON, declared that ICE’s August 5 announcement “shows
that ICE also systematically misled the states, engaging in protracted
negotiations—at substantial cost to the American public—for what it now
claims are sham contracts.”230 Mr. Newman’s remark reflects widespread
frustration with the lack of clarity and consistency that the government has
provided since S-Comm’s inception.
Mr. Morton enclosed a fact sheet with his August 5 memorandum, which
addresses frequently asked questions about S-Comm. Among the questions
answered is: “[c]an a state or local law enforcement agency choose not to
have fingerprints it submits to the FBI checked against DHS’ system?”231
ICE responded that
Secure Communities is mandatory in that, once the informationsharing capability is activated for a jurisdiction, the fingerprints
that state and local law enforcement voluntarily submit to the FBI
to be checked against the DOJ’s biometric identification system
for criminal history records are automatically sent to DHS’s
biometric system to check against its immigration and law
enforcement records.232
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ICE goes on to affirm that states and LLEAs may not choose to have
fingerprints processed by the federal government only to check an
individual’s criminal history, nor may states or LLEAs ask that
“identifications” resulting from DHS’s fingerprint processing be withheld
from local ICE field offices.233 This recent information from ICE reinforces
the agency’s position that states and localities may not opt out of S-Comm.
It appears now that the only option states and local jurisdictions have is to
elect not to receive information about identifications resulting from DHS’s
fingerprint databases provided to local ICE field offices.234
A. Affirmative Actions for Non-Complying Cities
Prior to ICE’s August 5 fact sheet describing S-Comm’s mandatory
requirements, it was unclear how much a locality could do to affirmatively
resist participation in the program. Passively, a city may still be able to
decline to arrest undocumented immigrants, and sheriffs can refuse to issue
ICE detainers, but these options give rise to complications. If a locality has
a sanctuary policy, it may be able to decline compliance with detainers due
to S-Comm’s conflict with the policy.235
Because S-Comm shares data between two federal departments (DHS
and FBI), the only way a jurisdiction could avoid taking part in S-Comm is
by refusing to send fingerprints to the federal justice system,236 even though
they have the legal authority to decide when to hold an individual subject to
an ICE detainer.237 However, ICE has since declared that this is not an
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option,238 and, as stated above, this choice would seriously undermine the
crime-fighting functions of LLEAs.239 LLEAs that decline to share
fingerprints with the Justice Department would lose access to state and
federal criminal databases.240
LLEAs still have the power to elect whether to review the information
DHS returns to them in response to the fingerprints.241 However, the choice
not to review this information does little more than turn a blind eye to
practices in which LLEAs do not want to participate. The choice leaves
localities with little control: ICE maintains the ability to initiate deportation
of individuals in question, regardless of an LLEA’s position on the
matter.242 Further, since ICE’s termination of MOAs, states no longer have
the option to request that the MOAs be revised to better align the
agreements with local priorities.
Some activists would choose a more court-based, and perhaps more
proactive, method of protest. They believe that government trial attorneys
are not enforcing their stated priorities and that immigration courts should
weigh in. One possible method for bringing issues with S-Comm to DHS’s
attention is to file complaints in all cases that are not responding to Level 1
or Level 2 criminals. This would place a large burden on the court and force
DHS to implement more than just the policy directive that is currently SComm.243
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B. S-Comm in California and Assemblymember Ammiano’s TRUST Act
In May 2009, the California Department of Justice entered into an MOA
with ICE regarding implementation of S-Comm in the state.244 Since then,
S-Comm has been activated in all fifty-eight LLEA jurisdictions, including
Santa Clara County.245 When Santa Clara County received information from
ICE in October 2009, the county understood the program as voluntary and
did not take action or return a questionnaire about current county jail
booking practices.246
ICE notified Santa Clara County in April 2010 of its plan to activate SComm in the jurisdiction.247 Although the Board of Supervisors had not
approved participation, ICE activated S-Comm in the county in May 2010,
stating that approval from the Board was not required.248 Despite a
unanimous decision by the Board to opt out of the program, S-Comm in
Santa Clara County led to 523 individuals being arrested or booked into
ICE custody from the beginning of May 2010 until the end of September
2010.249 One hundred thirty-three of those individuals had no criminal
record.250 Implementation in Santa Clara County also led to 241 people
removed from the United States, eighty-one of whom had no criminal
record.251
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Despite statements that localities may not opt out of S-Comm, Santa
Clara and several other counties are looking for ways to minimize the
effects of the program. For example, Santa Clara County’s counsel
presented a report to the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors’ Public
Safety and Justice Committee suggesting that the board direct the county
administration to make certain that no county funds are used to “provide
unreimbursed assistance to [US] Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
including assistance requested through immigration detainers,” except as
prescribed by law.252 Taking the report into account, the committee
instructed the county counsel and other county departments to collaborate
and develop a recommendation about complying with detainers that also
considers public safety.253
On the state level, California Assemblymember Tom Ammiano
introduced the TRUST Act (AB 1081) in February 2011. AB 1081, labeled
the Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools Act, or “TRUST
Act,” calls for modifications to the now-rescinded MOA between
California’s Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information and DHS
regarding S-Comm.254 The TRUST Act would authorize counties to
participate in S-Comm only upon submission of an authorized request to
ICE by the county’s legislative body,255 thus allowing counties to choose
whether to participate in the program. The TRUST Act also provides
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directives for safeguards against racial profiling, protections for victims of
crime, including survivors of domestic violence, and a requirement that ICE
establish a complaint process and provide quarterly statistics on S-Comm
on its website.256 The act passed the California Assembly in May 2011, and
will be revised in early January before it goes to the state senate.257 Though
Ammiano’s act addresses the important concerns S-Comm’s
implementation raises, it may not be viable in light of ICE’s rescission of
MOAs. If ICE’s June 2011 reforms are effective—and ICE officials and
attorneys do indeed exercise care and discretion in immigration
enforcement—the TRUST Act’s goals may be met nonetheless if ICE
officials protect survivors of domestic violence and shift their focus to
serious offenders and those who pose a threat to national security.
California is not alone in its resistance to S-Comm. Illinois,
Massachusetts, and New York have also resisted participation in the
program.258 While states and counties continue to explore ways to work
around or avoid S-Comm, the federal government should implement more
reforms to the program and ensure that ICE follows through with its recent
changes. The next section details suggested reforms, including the ability
for localities like Santa Clara to opt out.

VII. S-COMM RE-ENVISIONED: REFORMS TO A POTENTIALLY
INEVITABLE PROGRAM
Unfortunately for many immigrants, S-Comm will be a nationwide
reality in the very near future. Though communities should make their own
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adjustments to the program, S-Comm as a whole would benefit from a
number of changes in order to make the program more cost-effective and
less detrimental to immigrants and their families.259 HSAC’s Task Force
recommendations include: increasing transparency and clarifying what SComm is and how it works, increasing consistency among DHS’s
immigration enforcement programs, working with state and local officials
to “develop trust” in S-Comm, reaffirming enforcement priorities and
ensuring that S-Comm adheres to its goals, and exercising discretion in
enforcement.260 The recommendations below reflect some of the task
force’s suggestions, and go further to ensure greater protection for
immigration communities.
First, individuals arrested for suspected acts of domestic violence should
not be screened for S-Comm programs until they are convicted. This delay
in sending fingerprints could spare wrongly arrested victims of domestic
violence the additional torment of deportation. Second, S-Comm should
screen only those individuals convicted of serious Level 1 offenses, and
only upon conviction (rather than at the pre-conviction stage), and not Level
2 or 3 offenders who are not a threat to public safety. Though ICE would
not likely accept such a change or allow counties to adopt the practice, this
change would curb the number of individuals trapped in deportation
proceedings, reduce the cost of implementing S-Comm, and limit
deportation to those immigrants who are serious criminals.
DHS should rethink its stance on S-Comm’s mandatory implementation
requirement and provide clear procedures and guidelines for options
available to states and counties firmly opposed to S-Comm. This will enable
those jurisdictions to comply with or decline to comply with the program in
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ways that are both constitutional and consistent with local public policy. All
participating jurisdictions should also be trained on illegal racial or ethnic
profiling in an effort to avoid discriminatory police practices.261
In order to determine the actual effects and efficacy of S-Comm,
quarterly data collection and analysis made available to the public should
include more than just match rates, proportions of “lower-level alien
offenders,” and removal proportions.262 For instance, the information could
include the number of searches localities conducted using S-Comm
databases, and the number and level of “hits” obtained through S-Comm
disaggregated by the number of hits where charges were not filed, where
charges were later dismissed, or where there is no conviction, as well as the
number of incorrect “hits.”
Most importantly, the federal government should explicitly allow local
governments, especially sanctuary cities, and LLEAs to opt out of S-Comm.
By doing so, the federal government would appropriately respect local
authorities’ judgment.263 Once a locality opts out, the FBI should not share
fingerprints from that locality with ICE. Respecting local judgment is not
inconsistent with DHS’s stated goals for S-Comm (e.g., deporting
criminals) especially in regard to Level 1 offenders, who ICE will deport
regardless.
If these safeguards are not implemented, and if ICE’s reforms are
ineffective, S-Comm will continue to threaten the civil liberties and safety
of immigrants and US citizens alike, especially people of color.264
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Through S-Comm, ICE requests that local governments participate in the
historically federally regulated area of immigration. While it is unclear
whether S-Comm exceeds the federal government’s power, it is clear that
the program’s repercussions are far reaching and that many of them are
destructive. In order to avoid some of the devastating consequences on
LLEAs, families, employers, and state and local governments, the federal
government must make changes to S-Comm. The government should defer
to local governments’ judgments by allowing them to opt out of the
program, and DHS and CRCL must ensure that their proposed changes
actually take effect.
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